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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents agree generally with Appellants1 statement of the nature of the case.

DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Respondents agree generally with Appellants1 statement of the disposition by the Industrial Commission.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to have the award of the Industrial
Commission dated October 25, 1974 affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Utah.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree generally with Appellants1 statement of facts.
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POINT I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE APPLICANTS INJURIES AND
COMPENSATION.
Learned counsel for the plaintiff very adequately
covered the statutory ground and general principles concerning the Special Fund under U.C.A. 35-l-68# 69. Respondents therefore will endeavor not to be repetitive in these
areas.
The basic issue plaintiff raises on appeal is whether
the Commission^ guidelines are arbitrary in interpreting
U.C.A. 35-1-69. The pertinent part of that statute that
creates difficulty in interpretation includes:
"35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting
in permanent incapacity—Basis of Compensation—Special fund—Training of
employee—(1) If any employee who has
previously incurred a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or
congenital causes, sustains an industirial
injury for which compensation and medical
care is provided by this title that results in permanent incapacity which is
substantially greater than he would have
incurred if he had not had the preexisting incapacity, compensation and
medical care, which medical care and
other related items are outlined in
section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the
basis of the combined injuries, but the
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liability of the employer for such compensation and medical care shall be for
the industrial injury only and the remainder shall be paid out of the special
fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1)
hereinafter referred to as the "special
fund"... (Emphasis added).
The language "substantially greater" poses distinct
problems of interpretation for the Industrial Commission, as
the phrase is unduly broad and general.
The commission has long struggled with the meaning of
this phrase, and has to the best of its ability, attempted to
evaluate claims on a case by case basis, rather than setting
down inflexible guidelines. When pressed for guidelines in
the O'Driscoll case, cited at page 16 of plaintiff's brief,
the Commission explained this policy:
"The Commission has for years, labored
with problems of this (35-1-69) section
and has endeavored to interpret what constitutes 'substantially greater.1 The
guidelines of what 'substantially greater'
means are elusive and difficult, even
among the Commissioners. The Commission
has not formulated a written policy regarding this matter, although in private
discussions reference has been made to a
50% and a 40% figure. Said percentages
were discussed in terms of the amount of
percentage the industrial accident had
to contribute before it became "substantially greater" within the meaning
intended in the Workmen's Compensation
law. The Commission had endeavored to
treat each case individually with the
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idea in mind that each case would
stand on its own facts, with no
particular immovable policy being
S6i# » i »

It is thus amply clear the Commission is trying to remain flexible on this statute, in an effort to work equitable
results# as the business of determining percentages of a
man's disability is subjective at best.
Yet, plaintiff's counsel argues on pg. 21 of their brief
that:
"If the Commission is sustained
here, every worker with greater than
50% prior disability should be disqualified for any subsequent injury
of 49% or less, since the second injury cannot be substantially greater
arithmetically. Such arbitrary criteria makes the statute inoperative."
Contrary to what plaintiff's counsel argues here, it is
abundantly clear from the Commission's language in the O'Driscoll
case, cited supra, and in the plaintiff's own brief—that the
40-50 percent range is merely a general guideline, and not an
"immovable standard."
Next, plaintiff attacks the reference to California
statutes by the Industrial Commission, stating that such
statutes are not relevant here. (pg. 19 Appellant's brief).
Upon closer examination of what the Industrial Commission is
actually doing, it is plain that there is nothing wrong with
the Commission referring to a California statute for assistance

in interpreting a Utah statute.
The Utah statute itself is broad and general, yet the
Industrial Commission, by mandate of the legislature, must
interprete it. The commission has for the most part been
left to its own means in doing so. Thus, because California
has codified some specific guidelines in their workmen's compensation statute, the Utah Industrial Commission has turned
to California, just as courts often look to other jurisdictions,
to get some guidance in how other states have handled similiar
statutory interpretation problems. Thus, far from being unlawful, the Commission's reference to the California statute
is reasonable, and an indication of the Commission's attempt
to act in good faith.
No where has the Commission adopted the California
standard as its own, but even if they did, this would not be
improper.

Due to the broadness of the statute in question,

and the powers vested in the Industrial Commission, it appears
that the Commission is free to adopt any reasonable standard
of interpretation of the law.
Further, there is statutory and case law that gives
great deference to orders and decisions of the Industrial
Commission.. U.C.A. 35-1-20 states:

T5-

"Orders of commission—Presumed lawful—
All orders of the commission within its
jurisdiction shall be presumed reasonable
and lawful until they are found otherwise
in an action brought for that purpose, or
until altered or revoked by the commission.11
It appears that here the legislature has given the
orders of the Industrial Commission a statutory presumption of
lawfulness.

Likewise, we urge the Court in the instant case,

barring any evidence presented by plaintiff that the Commission
abused its discretion, should uphold the presumption and not
disturb the Commission's findings.
As to review of Industrial Commission hearings and orders,
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has a long history of
giving great deference to the Commission's findings. Just a
few of many cases in this line of decisions include:
In Spencer v. Industrial Commission 20 P.2d 618, 621,
81 U. 511, the Court said: "A broad discretion is vested in
the Industrial Commission by statute with respect to the manner
in which its investigations shall be conducted. Unless it is
shown that some substantial right of a party has been denied
him, or that he has been deprived of an opportunity to fairly
and fully develop his case, this court will not interfere to
direct the method of conducting such hearings or investigations."
In Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial Commission,
196 P. 853, 856, 57 U. 589, The Utah Supreme Court stated: "This
court is now firmly committed to the doctrine that it will examine into the evidence only to ascertain whether there is any
substantial evidence in support of the findings of its commission and whether it has either acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction."

And again, in Utah Console Mining Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 240 P. 440, 441, 66 U. 173, the Utah High Court
reaffirmed their long standing policy:
"This court has consistently and persistently held that
our powers are limited to the determination of whether the
Commission has exceeded its powers or has disregarded some
positive provision of law in making or in denying an award."
And finally, the Court said in Ostler v. Industrial
Commission 84 U. 428, 36 P.2d 95:
"Unless upon the whole record it
can be said that the Commission acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in making
its findings, this court under the
statute is without authority to interfere. It is not for this court in
matters of evidence to interfere or to
substitute its judgment for that of the
Commission unless it is made clearly to
appear that the Commission has misconstrued or misapplied the provisions of
the statute; but if such is made to
appear, then it becomes the duty of the
court to correct the same. Where there
is substantial competent evidence to
support an award, it will not be disturbed, likewise when there is no substantial competent evidence to support
an award or an order denying an award,
it is held the award or order must be
affirmed, not because the Commission
acted arbitrarily or capriciously,
but because of the insufficiency of
competent evidence. It is said in
this regard that "the commission may
not without sufficient cause arbitrarily refuse to follow the uncontradicted evidence, yet, before this
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court can say that the commission
acted arbitrarily or capriciously :'
in the matter, it must be made
clearly to appear that such was
in fact the case." Kavalinakis v.
Ind. Comm. et al., 67 Utah, 174,
246 P. 698, 701? Hauser v. Ind.
Comirw, 77 Utah, 419, 296 P. 780."
Defendant Industrial Commission respectfully submits
that their guidelines are not arbitrary or capracious as
plaintiff contends, that plaintiff failed to produce any
evidence or facts to support his claim to that effect, and
that therefore the court should affirm the Commission's order
in accordance with long standing Supreme Court policy.

POINT II.
EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS THAT
THE COMMISSION ERRED BY BASING ITS
ORDER ON ARBITRARY GUIDELINES, THE
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR REHEARING.
Even assuming arguendo that the State Industrial
Commission abused its discretion by making decisions in this
case on arbitrary guidelines, the appropriate remedy is to
remand the case to the commission for rehearing.
for this is twofold:

The reason

first, the Court may possibly find a

need for further evidentiary hearings concerning Mr. McPhie's
injuries based on a new court enunciated guidelines. And

second, because United States Steel Corporation is not represented in this hearing on appeal, remanding the case would
give them an opportunity to adequately protect their interests
in the case.
Defendant Commission strongly urges the court, however,
to affirm the commission's order, as based on the facts of
this case, it is unlikely any better result can be reached on
rehearing*

Our argument will endeavor to explicate this point.

Section 35-1-69 provides that certain benefits be paid
to an employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapacity by accident, disease or congenital causes, who then
sustains an industrial injury which results in permanent incapacity substantially greater than he would have incurred if
he had not had the pre-existing incapacity.

These benefits

are to be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries but
the liability of the employer and/or insurance carrier shall
be for the industrial injury only, and the remainder shall be
paid out of the special fund.
The law then provides that a Medical Panel be set up
to determine:
1.

The total permanent physical impairment from all

causes.
2.

The percentage of permanent physical impairment

attributable to the industrial injury.

3.

The percentage of permanent physical impairment

attributable to the pre-existing condition*
After the above determinations have been made, the
Commission shall then assess the liability for payment of
benefits —

the employer and/or insurance carrier shall pay

the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable
to the industrial injury only and the remainder shall be paid
out of the special fund.
The medical panel mentioned supra, found inter alia in
its Medical Panel Report finding (R. 202, 203), "7. Mr. McPhie
does have a significant functional component to his problem
at the present time."
Within the law of Workmen's Compensation, "functional
component" or as it is sometimes called, "functional overlay,"
has a specialized meaning.

In Quednan v. Langrish 137 A.2d

544, 548, 144 Conn. 706, it was defined as such:
"The term 'functional overlay' appears to be a substitute for 'psychogenic
overlay,' which has been definded as 'the
•emontionally determined increment to an
existing symptom or disability which has
been of an organic or physically traumatic
origin." Laughlin, Meuroses in Clinical
Practice, p. 732.
See also Words and Phrases volume 17a pg. 539, "Functional
Overlay", and volume 35 pg. 12 "Psychogenic Overlay."
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Basically then, the functional component of an injury
is the emotional or psychiatric harm that results from the
industrial injury, but is not physical in nature resulting
directly from the industrial accident. Nevertheless, the
functional component can be severe in a given case, and contribute substantially to a workman's overall disability.
Thus, applying this to the facts of the instant case,
perhaps Mr. McPhie is in fact entitled to a determination of
a higher percentage of disability than the 15 percent that
was previously determined by the medical panel as attributtable to the July 2 3, 1972 accident. We base this conclusion
on the language found in Dr. Alan Jeppsen's letter of psychiatric evaluation of Mr. McPhie (R. 204, 205) which states in
pertinent part:
"In answering question number
seven from the Industrial Commission,
Mr. McPhie does have a significant
functional component to his problem at "..\the present time, Mr. McPhie had a
chronic pain syndrome in 1966 following his accident. I This predisposed
him to have another traumatic neurosis
develop after this recent injury to
his cervical spine. I think on top of
that, his impaired mental functioning
predisposed him to focus on this limitation as an explanation of his poor
functioning. The accident of July 2 3,
1972 would have to be considered the
precipitating and aggravating event."
(Emphasis added)
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It appears from this language that the "significant
functional component" referred to may well in fact constitute
a substantial part of Mr. McPhie's total disability. But,
more importantly to the issue at hand, it also appears that
this functional component may not have been present prior to
the July 23, 1972 accident*
Now, according to U.C.A. 35-1-69 as amended, if the
significant functional impairment did not exist before the
July 2 3# 1972 accident, then the employer, (United States
Steel Corporation or its insurance carrier) would be responsible for the liability accrueing from the injury. This
is because the special fund as explained earlier, only pays
for that amount of the total disability that was pre-existing
to the industrial accident*

The employer, U.S. Steel Corp.,

or its insurance carrier, is responsible for that percentage
of the injury that results concurrent or subsequent to the
accident, such as the functional component overlay.
Thus in the instant case, much of Mr. McPhie's total
disability is directly related to his functional overlay, as
explained in Dr. Jeppson's letter.

Likewise, there is a very

strong possibility that the functional overlay created liability
the employer or his insurance carrier should bear, if the overlay is a result of the July 2 3, 1972 injury* and was not, as
required by U.C.A. 35-1-69, pre-existing to the Industrial

accident. However, since United States Steel is not represented in this appeal, we therefore respectfully submit
if the court finds that the Commission abused its discretion
and made its order in the instant case based on arbitrary
guidelines, then the case should be remanded to the Industrial
Commission for an evidentiary hearing on the subject of the
functional component overlay.

This would be to determine

when it occurred, i.e. prior to or subsequent to the July 23,
1972 accident, and what proportion of Mr. McPhie's total
disability the functional component overlay consisted of,
over and above the 15 percent that has already been determined
as resultant from the July 1972 accident.
The purpose of such a new hearing, if found necessary
by the court, would be to re-examine the evidence relating to
the functional component; however, defendants strongly urge
against such a rehearing, due to the facts in the instant case.
In the commission's conclusions of law (R. 228) the Commission
stated:
"Considering Claimant's prior
history and complaints, and considering the multiple problems
following the July 2 3, 1972
accident, the various hospitalization, diagnostic efforts and
cervical surgery were not unreasonable under the circumstances. The
Medical Panel concluded that much
-13-

of Claimant's disability was
attributable to previously existing, co-existing and subsequent
conditions. They also concluded
that it was impossible to separate
into distinct categories the various aspects or components of
Claimant's permanent impairment
because of the significant functional component being involved
in the problem." (Emphasis added).
Despite this language, if the court finds a new hearing
is in order, it would appear necessary for the commission to
re-evaluate the claimant's injuries in the context of new
guidelines set out by the court, to prevent saddling either
U.S. Steel or the Special Fund with the entire amount of
liability.
Nevertheless, it must be concluded that the instant
facts make for a hard case, because as stated by the Commission supra, they believed it to be impossible to properly
apportion the various aspects or components of the claimant's
injuries to before or after the accident.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission has taken a very hard set of
facts, and has tried to come to an equitable settlement for
the claimant.

The Commission has acted in good faith, inter-

preting and applying the state statute to the best of their
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ability.

Unless there is some evidence that there has been

a clear abuse of discretion by the Commission, the Supreme
Court should allow the Commission's order to stand.

Further

even should the court find such an abuse of discretion, the
proper remedy is to remand the case to be heard in the context
of court established guidelines. Nevertheless, we respectfully
urge the court to let this Commission order stand as is. We
likewise respectfully urge that if any new guidelines or
changes are to be made in the statute, this is in the province
of the legislature to establish such guidelines or changes,
DATED this t*

day of May, 1976.

Respectfully submitted.

VERNON B, ROMNEY
Attorney General

FRANK V. NELSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
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This is to certify that I mailed two (2) copies of
the foregoing brief to A. Wally Sandack, Attorney for Applicant and Appellant, 370 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111; and one (1) copy to Erie V* Boorman, Attorney
for another party Defendant and Respondent, 79 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 6th day of May, 1976,

FRANK V. NELSON
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